Ceasefire Agreement 1973

According to Finnish historian Jussi Hanhimki, South Vietnam was put under pressure because of the triangular diplomacy that isolated it to accept an agreement that virtually ensured its collapse. [21] During the negotiations, Kissinger stated that 18 months after an agreement, the United States would not intervene militarily, but that it could intervene before. In the history of the Vietnam War, this has been described as a “decent interval.” [22] Nixon asked the eminent Asian-American politician Anna Chennault to be his “channel to Mr. Thieu”; Chennault agreed and regularly reported to John Mitchell that Thieu had no intention of attending a peace conference. On November 2, Chennault told the South Vietnamese ambassador: “I just heard from my boss in Albuquerque, who says his boss [Nixon] is going to win. And you`ll tell your boss [Thieu] to hold on for a while longer. [8] Johnson learned about the NSA and was furious that Nixon had “blood on his hands” and that Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen agreed with Johnson that such an action was a “betrayal.” [9] [10] [11] Defence Minister Clark Clifford considered this to be an unlawful violation of the Logan Act. [12] In response, President Johnson ordered the listening of members of the Nixon campaign. [13] [14] Dallek wrote that Nixon`s efforts “probably made no difference” because Thieu was unwilling to participate in the talks and there was little chance of reaching an agreement before the elections; However, his use of the information provided by Harlow and Kissinger was morally questionable and Vice President Hubert Humphrey`s decision not to make Nixon`s actions public is “an unusual act of political decency.” [15] The International Commission investigates violations of the provisions of Article 18 of the agreement at the request of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission or the Biparty Joint Military Commission or a party, or, with respect to Article 9, Point B), the General Elections Agreement, the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord , or, in any event, if the international commission has other reasonable grounds to adopt it. that there has been a violation of these provisions.

It is understood that the international commission will work, if necessary, with the assistance and cooperation of the parties concerned in carrying out this task. b) In accordance with Article 18, point (f), of the agreement, the reports of the international commission are drawn up with the unanimous agreement of the representatives of the four members. In the absence of unanimity, the Commission sends the differing opinions to the four parties in accordance with Article 18, point b), the agreement or the two South Vietnamese parties covered by Article 18, point (c), of the agreement, but are not considered Commission reports. In order to avoid conflicts and secure the conditions of the armed forces that are in direct contact, and pending regulation by the joint military commissions, the commanders of the opposing forces meet in these places of direct contact as soon as the ceasefire comes into force to reach an agreement on the ternporary measures to prevent conflicts and to ensure the supply and medical care of these forces. Newly elected President Richard M. Nixon said in 1969 that he would continue U.S. participation in the Vietnam War to end the conflict and ensure “peace with honor” for the United States and its South Vietnamese allies. Unfortunately, the communist leaders of North Vietnam refused because they believed that the time was on their side, firm to negotiate seriously. Indeed, in March 1972, they tried to completely circumvent the negotiations with a total invasion of the South.