On August 30, 1963, the United States sent its first message to the Soviet Union via the hotline: “The fast brown fox jumped over the back of the lazy dog 1234567890.” Beyond the broader mission of managing the risks of crisis escalation, the changing nature of nuclear forces in India and Pakistan makes de-escalation of crises a growing challenge. India and Pakistan are increasingly using mobility and dispersal to ensure their survival. If a crisis develops, both countries will disperse the weapons as part of their mobilization efforts.  After reaching its peak and both sides decided to end the impasse, they had to bring their forces back to the garrison and less availability. Monitoring and verifying this redistribution of nuclear systems will be a major challenge, especially as mutual tensions and mistrust will be high. A phone line would be essential to coordinate de-escalation and ensure that one party does not think the other is cheating. On June 20, 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the “Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link,” also known as the Hotline Agreement. This agreement should help speed up communications between the two governments and prevent the possibility of accidental nuclear war. It is no coincidence that the agreement was reached just months after the Cuban Crisis in October 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear conflict. The new agreement should avoid such a crisis in the future. Most observers believe that the most likely trigger for a major nuclear-impact crisis is a very large terrorist attack perpetrated in India by Pakistani militants, which requires, in addition to the governments of Islamabad and New Delhi, intense third-party crisis resolution efforts. Analysts will discuss the extent of the Pakistani government`s control over anti-Indian militants, but previous crises have contributed to the presumption of guilt, if not support. In this case, a nuclear hotline would contain a crisis and limit escalation if events seem to go off the rails.
 The other major obstacle is the organizational separation between the nuclear apparatuses of India and Pakistan. The current DGMO hotlines work because similar organizations and people communicate with each other – an Indian crossing guard can talk to a Pakistani crossing guard, and they have similar roles and responsibilities and can speak under similar conditions. . . .